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THE BRITISH AND THE LIMITATIONS OF
MARITIME MANEUVER
Geoffrey Till

T

hese days, strategists, in effect, are turning their thoughts to the concept of
maritime maneuver associated with Sir Julian Corbett as a means of achieving their ends in an era of intensifying great-power competition, not least across
the western Pacific. Proponents assure others that this strategic approach offers
a wider range of diplomatic and operational options in peace as well as in war,
while limiting cost and liability, especially for countries that are more maritime
in their outlook. But there are costs, challenges, and limitations that need to be
addressed realistically if practice is to equal theory—if, indeed, it can. A review
of the British experience should help identify some of the issues that must be
resolved if maritime maneuver is to fulfill its strategic promise. Historically, that
promise has disappointed—in realized cost, achieved effect, or both—so often
that too much should not be expected of it.
But first, what are we talking about? What does maritime maneuver mean?
Maneuver and the maneuverist approach denote the attempt to shape a conflict
and attack an adversary’s cohesion either by coming from unexpected directions
or by employing a surprising and innovative manner of attack. The broad aim
is to outsmart the adversary rather than simply to subdue him through direct,
frontal attack, and thus to avoid the heavy costs that characterized the attritionalist approach to battle on the western front in the First World War, for example.
Churchill’s view was clear. In his account of the Dardanelles campaign, the
future prime minister wrote, “Battles are won by slaughter and maneuver. The
greater the general, the more he contributes in maneuver, the less he demands
in slaughter.”1 This famous aphorism summons up the juxtaposition of the two.
Yet while they often are treated as opposites, maneuver and attrition in fact are
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complementary. Most military campaigns exhibit both, in varying relative mixtures and at varying times, depending on a range of circumstances and intentions. Alongside the maneuverist aspects of the Battle of Trafalgar, for example,
there were some distinctly attritionalist ones as well, although Nelson’s aim at that
time was to ensure that the attrition was as one-sided as possible.2
The maneuver–attrition spectrum applies to all three of the levels of war: the
strategic, which relates to the war as a whole; the operational, which deals with
campaigns; and the tactical, which concerns the conduct of battle. The differences between these three levels of war are not clear-cut. As A. A. Svechin famously
sought to explain, strategy provides the framework within which the campaign
should be fought, while campaign planning does the same for the battles.3 For
this reason, failure at one level can rise up or cascade downward, adversely affecting outcomes at the other two levels of war.
Although none of these concepts or terms were around when Britain was
conducting most of its military campaigns, this article contends that the default
approach of the British to the conduct of their amphibious and shore-based conflicts was instinctively maneuverist in conception, but that a variety of adverse
circumstances at all three levels of war meant it often was much more attritionalist in practice than they wished. At all three levels, though, the British were
seeking maneuver while trying to avoid attrition. To the charge that all sensible
militaries try to do this, the response is that the British were trying to do it more
than most. This made sense for them because their control of the seas provided
them far more strategic opportunities than their adversaries had, while the costs
of maintaining that naval superiority meant they had a much smaller army than
their main adversaries did, and thus one that was unsuited to an attritionalist
style of war.
This brings us to the second part of the concept—its maritime nature. Corbett
was at pains to emphasize that the destinies of nations were decided essentially on
land, not at sea. Accordingly, navies were most strategically significant to the extent that they could influence the course of events ashore by what they did at and
from the sea. But importantly, there were limits to the effects that navies could
produce, especially when set against countries with great continental resources,
or in peacetime, when the use of overt military force was more constrained. In
such circumstances the other services and other economic, social, and political
levers of national power had to be an important part of the effort as well. The
naval contribution was an essential but usually insufficient element in a wholeof-government, if not whole-of-country, maritime approach to the advance and
defense of national interests. As Corbett made clear, maritime simply referred to
situations in which the sea was an important factor.4 Corbett’s colleague Charles
Callwell underlines the point that for this approach to succeed, “the whole of
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the machinery [of government] . . . [needs] to be set in motion [and] there must
be harmony in the council chamber and in the theater of operations.”5 For a
peacetime example of this approach, we need look no further than China’s transnational development program, the Belt and Road Initiative, which, whatever its
motivation, is built on a range of national efforts intended to combine to deliver
strategic effects, and in which the sea and both the navy and commercial shipping
are central to the outcome.
With that in mind, how have the British attempted over the years to put maritime and maneuver together? With what success, and what problems did they
encounter? And finally, how salient is all this to today’s circumstances?
EARLY INDICATIONS OF THE BRITISH SEARCH FOR
MARITIME MANEUVER
Corbett emphasized that maritime maneuver characterized the British style of
war in the eighteenth century. It combined naval, military, and economic power in
a uniquely beneficial and cost-effective way. This allowed the British to “become a
controlling force in the European system” and to maintain and extend their interests
by manipulating the balance of power in continental Europe through the controlled
and careful application of maritime power in peace and war.6
This approach had several components. First and foremost, it meant avoiding
entangling military commitments on the Continent, and instead fighting wars to
the last Prussian, Russian, or Frenchman, as the case might be. This preference is
confirmed by Tobias Smollett, considering the Seven Years’ War in his History of
England: “[M]any friends of their country exclaimed against the projected army
of observation in Germany, as the commencement of a ruinous continental war,
which it was neither the interest of the nation to undertake, nor in their power
to maintain, without starving the operations by sea, and in America, founded
on British principles.”7 The reference to “British principles” is interesting, as it
confirms an unspoken, typically national way of warfare.
Where the effort of supported surrogates was not enough to deliver the outcomes that Britain needed, command of the sea would allow its navy and an
expeditionary army to range across the world to attack the opponent’s trade, seize
his ports and colonies, and enrich Britain itself while securing strategic gains that
could be traded against possible losses in Europe. Thus, Pitt in 1796: “While the
violence of France has been over-running so great a part of Europe, and everywhere carrying desolation in its progress, your naval exertions have enabled you
to counterbalance their successes, by acquisitions in different parts of the globe,
and to pave the way for the restoration of peace to your allies, on terms which
their own strength might have been unable to procure.”8 This no doubt helps explain why he and others regarded the army as perhaps a necessary evil, whereas
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the navy, as the source of such strategic freedom to maneuver, was “[t]hat great
foundation of our strength, of our glory, and of our characteristic superiority
over the rest of the nations of Europe.”9 It also explains why, in the words of one
speaker in the House of Commons on the eve of the War of Jenkins’s Ear, “[I]t
would be one of the greatest Favours the French could do us to provoke us to a
Sea War, and one of the greatest Injuries we can do ourselves, is to engage without Necessity in an expensive
L and one.” 10 Others were
[W]hile they often are treated as opposites,
anxious to show that sea- and
maneuver and attrition in fact are compleland-based grand strategies
mentary. Most military campaigns exhibit
both, in varying relative mixtures and at vary- (not that they had either the
concepts or these words at the
ing times, depending on a range of circumtime) were complementary,
stances and intentions.
not opposites, emphasizing
the importance of sustaining armies that could deliver the necessary effects on
land and the requirement for a flourishing economy able to fund them.
At the operational and tactical levels, of course, things were not so simple, and
the historical record does much to justify Sir Michael Howard’s conclusion concerning “virtually every British amphibious operation since the age of Elizabeth”:
“[A]ll brilliant in conception, all lamentable in execution. The surprise and mobility which [Basil] Liddell Hart had seen as the essence of British maritime strategy, so far from ensuring success, had resulted over the centuries in an almost
unbroken record of expensive and humiliating failure.”11
Such, for example, was the fate of the 1741 venture against Cartagena, which,
though maneuverist in conception, turned out to be disastrously attritional in
execution.12 Some of the reasons for this were general ones that could apply to any
military operation, while others were especially characteristic of amphibious operations. In the first category fall such deficiencies as the poor mobilization and preparation of the force, the lack of surprise, the effects of disease, and the unimaginative
frontal tactics that led, for example, to the failure to take the fort of Saint Lazare by
land assault. The difficulties special to the conduct of amphibious operations include such things as the failure of naval gunfire support, from which commanders
took away the lesson that, to be effective, ships in the future must get within half a
musket shot of a strong fort, dangerous though that might be. The navy also was
distracted constantly by the need to guard against the sudden appearance of more
Spanish or even French ships. Above all, the expedition showed the dangers of an
almost complete absence of coordination between type commanders, at sea and on
land, who necessarily had different, if complementary, priorities.13
These problems did not mean that for such operational and tactical reasons
strategic maneuver of this sort always would fail. They did not, for example, in

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021

5

Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 3, Art. 4

TILL

17

the seizure of Quebec in 1759 or of Havana in 1762, and in support of Wellington’s campaign in Spain against Napoléon. But they did underline the point that
for the concept to succeed, extensive preparations had to be made; this demanded
sufficient time and, above all, the establishment of a settled clarity of aim.
Arguably, the absence of either was the problem in the Crimean War a century
after Britain’s defeat at Cartagena. Again, in essence it was a brilliant concept, especially when linked to an outflanking threat to the Russian position in the Baltic and
to Saint Petersburg itself to pressure Russia’s capacity and will to continue the war.
However, it was a venture that proved much more costly than expected through
lamentable failures of preparation; through continuous delays in execution, which
gave an obdurate adversary time to construct his defenses; and through the crass
failings of an army ill prepared to take on a determined and powerful major competitor at a distance as part of a campaign of maritime maneuver.14
THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN
From 1914, Britain’s conduct of the First World War was partly a result of its belief
that Germany had a policy and clear strategic aim of turning itself into the powerhouse of Mitteleuropa, through a “linking up of Germany, and Austria-Hungary
to Asia by means of the Balkans and Turkey,” thereby maintaining a clear threat to
Britain’s imperial communications and constituting “a direct thrust at our Indian
Empire.”15 The center, or the heartland, then would dominate the periphery, just
as Halford Mackinder had prophesied.16 In the early days of the war, such considerations led to concern about the future role of Turkey and to explorations of
the policy Britain should adopt in regard to a conflict among Greece, Turkey, and
Russia.17 This was the culmination of over a century of worry about what might
happen in this strategically crucial area.18
The immediate requirement, though, was to stabilize the western front in
Europe. Once that had been achieved, and until the mass mobilization of British forces was completed in 1916, there was little more—the so-called Easterners argued—that Britain usefully could contribute to the situation there. This
provided a maneuverist window of opportunity for the more-imaginative and
cost-effective use of Britain’s limited new reinforcements in a secondary theater
of operations—such as Gallipoli—for an indirect assault on the country’s enemies.19 The possibility of a thrust against Turkey first was adumbrated clearly by
Maurice Hankey, secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, in his Boxing
Day memorandum of 1914.20
Gallipoli: The Search for Strategic Maneuver
Again, in true Corbettian style, Britain’s command of the sea seemed to offer the
opportunity to conduct a limited intervention to achieve strategic-level objectives
in an unlimited war, thereby avoiding the costly, large-scale commitments required
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss3/4
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of most of its continental counterparts. At the same time, the British hoped to create decisive effects through their ability to menace the exposed vulnerabilities of a
land-bound adversary, either along the European coastline or in its colonial holdings. Nowadays this would be called the natural strategy of the “offshore balancer,”
a country able, at minimum cost, to “become a controlling force in the European
system” and to maintain and extend its interests by manipulating the balance of
power in continental Europe.21
Julian Corbett (as so often was the case) summarized the strategic aspiration
brilliantly in his history of the First World War:
[W]hen a war is sufficiently maritime in character for the sea to become an essential
factor, secondary theatres may be decisive. It was in the Peninsula we had made our
chief contribution to the overthrow of Napoleon; in the Crimea the Russian war had
been won; and by the conquest of Havana we had brought the Seven Years’ War to its
sudden and triumphant conclusion. In all three examples the result was due to the
concentration of naval and military force where the enemy was weakest.22

General Sir Ian Hamilton, British army, commander in chief of the Mediterranean Force, also understood the advantages that British sea power had to confer
in this respect. A convinced Easterner, he advocated for a defensive campaign in
the west and an offensive in the east. Otherwise, it would be a case of “not exploiting our own special characteristics, mobility and sea power!”23 Some Germans
agreed. “Should the Dardanelles fall,” declared Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, State
Secretary of the Imperial Naval Office, “the World-War has been decided against
us.”24
Other Germans disagreed. Recent experience, thought General Colmar von der
Goltz, “should put an end to the old times when a few thousand French or English
troops escorted by a fleet were able to compel the governments of large and populous countries in Eastern Asia to comply with their will.” He concluded, “In highly
civilized and thickly populated countries . . . landings never have any prospect of
great success.”25 Most in the British army thought so too. For them, the Gallipoli
project was conditional and temporary. Once Britain had mobilized fully for war,
the main effort would again need to be in France, as the seminal Committee of
Imperial Defence meeting of 1911 had concluded. General Charles C. Monro
put it forward with characteristic bluntness. “France,” he said, “is the only place
Germany can be beaten. Every man not employed in killing Germans in France
and Flanders is wasted.”26 “Westerners” like him initially went along with a scheme
in Turkey that they thought was a navy-centric forcing of the straits that would
require only limited land support and would not divert too much effort from the
western front.27 The failure of the bold, navy-only scheme to force the straits on
19 March 1915 dashed those hopes and meant that the next stage, if there was one,
would require a much greater maritime-maneuver enterprise.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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From then on, a crucial mismatch between the demands of the objective and
the size and quality of the resources allocated for the purpose seemed to confirm
the Westerners’ skepticism. It made the larger Gallipoli campaign seem “a dream
of vain imaginings.”28 The mismatch violated the German philosopher Immanuel
Kant’s imperative that whoever wills the aim also must will the means.29 In part,
this was a consequence of the extremely short timeline between the initial failure
of the naval campaign to force the Dardanelles in March and the start of what
was in effect a full-fledged amphibious operation a bare five weeks later. Given
the known complexities of amphibious operations (especially one that was in a
theater a long way from home; that would take place in an environment that was
challenging, climatically and topographically; and that would be opposed from
the start), this was a level of ambition bordering on the reckless. It fully justified
the conclusion of Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss, RN, who, in supervising the logistics
base at Mudros, Greece, was in a good position to judge. “Never in the history of
the world has such an expedition sailed, never has a big campaign been so hastily organized and got together, and never has such an undertaking had so little
consideration been given from home.”30
Uncertainty about how the strategic aim was to be achieved dramatically
increased the scale of the mismatch between the objectives and the means provided. The problem was that the exact nature and status of the operation never
really was hammered out in the highest strategy-making forum, the War Council—which itself was an essay in joined-up government, undermined by the amateur nature of its proceedings. The council’s maladroit sins included an absence of
minutes, which allowed people to draw different conclusions from its “decisions,”
or indeed to question whether decisions had been made at all, and a tendency
simply to paper over the cracks between divided opinions. Its composition was
faulty, too, with the military professionals present only as constrained advisers.31
Right from the start, there was uncertainty about how the strategic goal of the
campaign—knocking Turkey out of the war—was to be achieved, and therefore
about the extent and nature of the resources to be provided for it. The absence of a
clear-cut and agreed-upon vision for the operation was evident in the War Council’s well-known order of 13 January 1915: “The Admiralty should also prepare for
a naval expedition in February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula with
Constantinople as its objective.”32 The last phrase was inherently ambiguous, and
it was far from clear how the Admiralty could “take” the peninsula, since obviously this could be accomplished only by land forces.33 Nor was the connection
between the taking of the peninsula and the subsequent advance on Constantinople very clear to anyone.
Hamilton’s account of the idiosyncratic manner in which Field Marshal H. H.
Kitchener, British army, the secretary of state for war, apprised him of his mission
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and the sparseness of his subsequent directives is equally familiar: “The Admiral
[de Robeck] asked to see my instructions and Braithwaite read them out. When
he stopped, Roger Keyes, the Commodore, inquired, ‘Is that all?’ And when
Braithwaite confessed that it was, everyone looked a little blank.”34 Was this a
joint maritime operation, or was it essentially a naval operation with a degree of
army support? Was it just a question of the fleet turning up off Constantinople,
or would the army have to garrison the hinterland, or the peninsula, or both?
Were the Russians to be involved, or were they not? These issues were nebulous
in themselves and, worse still,
they went through a con[T]he default approach of the British to the
conduct of their amphibious and shore-based stant shifting throughout the
conflicts was instinctively maneuverist in con- campaign.
The result was a continuception, but . . . a variety of adverse circumstances at all three levels of war meant it often ing gap between the varying
was much more attritionalist in practice than extent and nature of the commitment, on the one hand,
they wished.
and the level of resources
allocated toward it, on the other. The gap reflected fundamental differences
of opinion about what exactly the project was designed to achieve and how. A
navy-centered operation well might require fewer soldiers, and that indeed was
the original intention, but the larger amphibious operation that became necessary later required far more land forces—but did not get them at the start of the
campaign, when they were most needed for decisive effect. Thus, Walter E. Guinness, Lord Moyne, looking back on 8 November at the campaign so far, stated,
“We heard this morning that Lord Kitchener is on his way out. It is difficult to see
how we can withdraw from here without great losses. Never can a campaign have
been worse managed. Although 17 Divisions have been sent out here, it has always
been by driblets which have not even sufficed to replace the wastage. If all the men
who have been out here could have been available simultaneously, something might
have been done.”35 This meant that Hamilton rarely had sufficient resources to
reinforce success or ameliorate failure. But if the military manpower going out
was thought insufficient by the Easterners, the Westerners considered it excessive
and likely to imperil the situation in France should the Germans launch another
assault.
The rate at which the nature of the operation changed, and the rapidity of the
switch from a navy-only operation to the conduct of a contested landing, greatly
exceeded the ability of Admiral Wemyss and all the other logisticians to deliver
what the expeditionary force required. For example, the whole of the Royal Naval
Division, when it arrived at Mudros in March, had to be sent back to Alexandria
and Port Said in Egypt for reorganization and restowing of its gear after the unit’s
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chaotic loading before departing Britain. The loading failures reflected uncertainty about the contemplated nature of the task.36 Given these grotesque failures
in planning for maneuver at the strategic level, it seems hardly less than a miracle
that Hamilton and his colleagues managed to get ashore and consolidate their position. All the same, these command failures inevitably had grave consequences
at the operational and tactical levels.
Gallipoli: The Search for Operational Maneuver
In terms of operational planning, the campaign was maneuverist also—at least as
far as intentions went. The notion of the navy bypassing Turkey’s western army
and storming through the Narrows to reduce Constantinople and paralyze Turkey in one fell swoop was certainly bold, and, according to at least some reputable
historians, perhaps the best idea of the First World War.37 When this failed, the
Allies had to resort to joint and combined action in an amphibious assault against
Turkey’s defenses in the straits so the navy could try again later. The campaign’s
official historian thought that this, too, could have worked.38 The basic intention
was clear: to use a bit of imagination, to avoid the enemy’s strength, to shatter his
will and coherence, to push him off balance, and to prevent his being able to stop
the Allies from doing what they wanted.
As Hamilton was perfectly aware, “the operation of landing in face of an enemy is the most complicated and difficult in war.”39 Things could go wrong easily, and they usually did; the pursuit of operational maneuver from the sea brings
risks as well as opportunities. Thus, Hamilton adopted a decidedly maneuverist
approach that was designed to maximize the Turks’ defensive problem by posing
to them a number of threats, from Bulair all the way south to the Asian shore,
that would force them to spread their forces out against all contingencies and
increase the prospects of operational and tactical surprise at the decisive point,
just as Corbett said the British had been able to do against the coast of France
in the Seven Years’ War. In forty-eight hours, the Allies intended to get ashore,
consolidate, and establish sustainable bridgeheads before the Turks had time to
react effectively.40 Hamilton planned that “the first and foremost step towards a
victorious landing was to upset the equilibrium of Liman von Sanders. . . . I must
try to move so that he should be unable to concentrate either his mind or his
men against us. . . . I have to separate my forces[,] and the effect of momentum,
which cannot be produced by cohesion, must be reproduced by the simultaneous nature of the movement.”41
Although admirable in theory, the plan failed on practical grounds. The basic
problem was that none of the possible landing sites was thought large enough to
accommodate the follow-on forces that first would consolidate the position, then
crucially expand it into a launching area for an assault on the broader peninsula;
only a combination of landing sites could do this. Such a broad-front advance was
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss3/4

10

22

Till: The British and the Limitations of Maritime Maneuver

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

unfortunate but seemed unavoidable. The diversionary feint against the Bulair
lines in the north and the landings on the Asiatic shore helped to dissipate Turkish
responses, but not enough. As a result, the Allies’ offensive force was spread too
thinly, and the Turkish defenders had time to respond, thereby confining the
invaders to much narrower bridgeheads than the hoped-for breakout required.
In part, this reflected a grievous underestimation of the resistance to be expected
from the initially quite modest level of Turkish defenses.
Later, Hamilton tried again with the Suvla landings of 6 August. As he allegedly wrote in his diary at the time:
K[itchener] sees in a flash what the rest of the world does not seem to see so clearly;
viz., that the piling up of increased forces opposite entrenched positions is a spendthrift,
unscientific proceeding. He wishes to know if I mean to do this. To draw me out he
assumes if I get the troops, I would at once commit them to trench warfare by crowding
them in behind the lines of Helles or Anzac. Actually I intend to keep the bulk of them
on the islands, so as to throw them unexpectedly against some key position which is not
prepared for defence.42

The Suvla operation was clearly an innovative, imaginative, and maneuverist approach at the operational level. Its aims were threefold: (1) to break out from Anzac
Cove and cut off the bulk of the Turkish army from land communication with Constantinople; (2) to gain such a command for British artillery as to cut off the bulk
of the Turkish army from sea communication with both Constantinople and Asia;
and (3) to secure Suvla Bay as a winter base for the Australian and New Zealand
Army Corps (ANZAC) and all the troops operating in the northern theater.43 None
of these objectives were realized. The forces of Lieutenant General Sir Frederick W.
Stopford did not go deep enough to create the necessary diversionary effect, and
the force based at Anzac Cove failed again to break out. The result was another
dead-end commitment that both sides had to service for the remainder of the year.
Hamilton’s conception of operational maneuver depended for its effect on
the coordinated activity of units acting autonomously in mutual support and
achieving surprise and momentum against a static and bewildered adversary. But
the Turks were neither static nor bewildered, and the two Allied forces at Anzac
Cove and Suvla were insufficiently coordinated and were unclear about the exact
purpose their respective parts in the operation served. Hamilton was clear that a
maneuverist approach demanded delegation of command and subordinates’ use
of their initiative in line with his intent as commander; but in this campaign it
was confusion, rather than command, that was delegated.44
The Suvla part of the operation demonstrated this particularly well. Stopford’s
unexpected decision not to go ashore until the evening of 8 August further aggravated the confusion, since it deprived him of an opportunity to sort out matters
there; moreover, his command ship, the tiny sloop HMS Jonquil, simply was not
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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equipped to deal with the large number of signals that command-and-control
functions required.
To a greater extent than often is realized, however, the indecision and inactivity at Suvla was not entirely Stopford’s fault, and it is worth pausing on this
point. A good deal of uncertainty derived from inherent ambiguities about what
Stopford was supposed to do. Latter-day critics often seem to assume that he was
expected to lead a large-scale flanking operation through open country to undermine Turkish resistance to the Allied position at Anzac Cove from the rear. But
this was not the case. Hamilton’s orders certainly were ambiguous (perhaps especially after he and Stopford had sought to clarify them), but the main effort was to
be made from Anzac Cove, not toward it; Suvla was to provide first a secure port,
and only then a degree of support for the expected breakout from the cove. In
this case, the “commander’s intent” was misinterpreted more by Stopford’s critics
than by Stopford himself.45
Nonetheless, the command system in place for the Suvla-Anzac operation
was at fault in that it did not encourage subordinates (particularly Stopford) to
use their own initiative to make the most of unexpected operational and tactical
opportunities. If they had prosecuted their opportunities more aggressively, the
British could have reached the hills that dominated the landing site more quickly,
thereby helping to facilitate the Anzac breakout. Finally, as far as Hamilton was
concerned, poor communications from Suvla obscured the extent to which
things were going wrong and required his intervention. Hamilton’s delegationheavy “negative command” system proved inappropriate for the practical circumstances at Suvla.
The Turks, on the other hand, seemed to suffer much less from this commandand-control deficiency and were able to mass effectively for large-scale defensive
and offensive actions. They also were clearer about what was happening on the
ground. The Allies’ difficulties were compounded by what these days would be
called “failures of situational awareness” about details of the ground (such as
the uncharted reefs off Suvla) and of the numbers, positions, and quality of the
Turkish defenders. The British thought, wrongly, that Hill 971 above the ANZAC
position was undefended. As a result, the operation violated some of the basic
principles of war—unity of command, mass, economy of force, and simplicity.46
Still, the Suvla landing went much better than had the earlier landings in April,
and had it been prosecuted more aggressively it might have helped to deliver the
maneuverist benefits for which Hamilton had hoped.
Gallipoli: The Search for Tactical Maneuver
The operational failure to dissipate the Turkish defenders’ strength put even
greater stress on the tactical ability of the Allied forces both to overcome those
defenses and to deliver tactical maneuver. Their best chance for doing this was
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss3/4
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upon the initial landings and very soon thereafter. But this was exactly the time
when all the well-known problems of defective landing procedures and equipment, of compressed and inhospitable landing sites, of inadequate numbers and
situational awareness, and of the unexpected fighting proficiency of the Turkish
defenders were at their height.47 Once the situation had stabilized, all the other
factors—heat, flies, and the impact of disease; adverse ground conditions; and the
strength of the tactical defensive achieved with entrenched firepower and barbed
wire—came into play as well, making an Allied advance much more difficult.
Already, at the third battle of Krithia, attritionalist western-front patterns of
battle seemed unavoidable—a lengthy and hopefully suppressing artillery bombardment followed by a frontal assault. Many of these constraints applied to the
Turkish defenders too, when it came to executing set-piece counteroffensives.
Even after the withdrawal from the ANZAC position in December, a wellthought-out final assault by the 12th Turkish Division on the British 13th Division, with an effective preliminary mining campaign and heavy artillery support,
was beaten back barely twenty-four hours before the final departure from Helles
on 8 and 9 January 1916.48 The Turks proved incapable of the Clausewitzian “pursuit” of the defeated that the retreating British had dreaded.
However hard the British tried to be maneuverist at the tactical level, events
devolved into attrition. The fate of the fresh-faced country boys of the 5th Battalion of the Wiltshire Regiment, which was part of the 40th Brigade of the British 13th Division, illustrates this all too well.49 The 13th Division was among the
three reinforcement divisions designated for Gallipoli in June. The 5th Wiltshires
were one of the first of Kitchener’s “New Army” formations of recently trained
volunteers. They arrived in Lemnos for a brief period of acclimatization in July,
and first were introduced into the conditions of conflict by being tasked to defend
the Hampshire Cut and Essex Knoll fire trenches of the extraordinarily complicated trench system to the northeast of the Helles front.
Duly “blooded,” they then were pulled back to Lemnos and, in an attempt to
avoid the replication of the attritional outcomes elsewhere and restore movement,
were dispatched next to the ANZAC sector to reinforce the Australian and New
Zealand troops in their attempted breakout against Chunuk Bair and Sari Bair,
concurrent with the Suvla landings. For the reasons discussed already, the experiences of the 5th Wiltshires in the gruesome, late, breakout battle on 10 August
illustrate all the difficulties that had to be faced in achieving tactical maneuver
in those conditions. They found themselves operating alongside Australian, New
Zealand, Gurkha, Sikh, and other British forces that were entirely new to them.
The topographical conditions were extremely difficult, especially at night. Early
encounters deprived them of many of their officers. The supply system failed, and
for four days and nights they lacked sleep, food, and water. And then, to cap it all
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off, they found themselves directly in the path of Mustafa Kemal’s newly arrived
7th and 12th Divisions sweeping down on them from above. Not surprisingly, in
this, their first real battle, their casualties were high and morale afterward was low.
However, they recovered and were reinforced by additional draftees from
home. Toward the end of the campaign, they were taken back to the safety of
Lemnos in the evacuation from Anzac Cove in December 1915. But then the 5th
Wiltshires, as part of the 13th Division, were sent back to the peninsula almost
immediately to hold the line for the final evacuation of Helles in January 1916.
Their role was to foil an expected last-minute Turkish attack aiming to destroy
the British as they tried to leave. The attack, the last major operation of the campaign, did indeed come, was repulsed with heavy losses, and served to show yet
again how difficult it was for either side to restore movement to the battle in the
conditions that had become the norm in the Gallipoli campaign. After their success in this encounter, the 5th Wiltshires were among the last of the “bravest and
steadiest” to leave the peninsula.
The “lessons” of Gallipoli have been sought widely ever since, first by the British
military in some exhaustive studies and later by the U.S. Marine Corps, and then
of course by legions of veterans, practitioners, and historians. It is indeed important not to be seduced by the advantages of hindsight into failing to recognize
the scale of the administrative achievement in improvising so large and difficult
an amphibious undertaking at such short notice.50 The tendency to focus on the
problems of the campaign should not blind observers to the fact of its successes.
Getting the army ashore in such numbers and keeping them there for so long
remains an impressive achievement. The Suvla landing and even more the final
evacuation showed how much had been learned during the course of the campaign by both services, separately and jointly. As so often, Corbett put the point
particularly well: “In that marvelous evacuation we see the national genius for
amphibious warfare raised to its highest manifestation. In hard experience and
successive disappointments the weapon had been brought to a perfect temper,
and when the hour of fruition came to show of what great things it was capable,
it was used only to effect a retreat.”51
Far from being depressed by the Gallipoli experience, the British, having absorbed its lessons (they thought) were prepared to try again the following year,
this time against the coast of Belgium—arguably the most heavily fortified stretch
of coastline in the world. This was to be part of an ambitious scheme at the high
operational level to restore movement to the western front, partly by an advance
along the Belgian coast, supplemented by a direct landing behind the German
lines by the 1st Division of the Fourth Army to outflank the right of the whole of
the German position in northern France.52
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The British fully recognized the challenge presented by this putative exercise in
operational maneuver on a grand scale. On the one hand, after the experiences of
Gallipoli, this realism resulted in investment in amphibious equipment ranging from
floating unloading pontoons to primitive amphibious tanks, and in an acceptance
that the operation would be possible only if a major diversionary push was made
farther down the line to draw the Germans away from the critical coastal sector.
The failure of the Passchendaele campaign in 1917 did not deliver these prerequisite
conditions, so Field Marshal Douglas Haig postponed the landing in August 1917,
and then it never took place.53 It remains one of the great what-ifs of the First World
War. But otherwise, it shows that the British still were searching for maneuver, and
had not lost faith in the capacity of maritime power projection to help deliver it.54
The exploits of the 5th Wiltshires after Gallipoli confirm this point. Far from
coming home to their green and pleasant land, as they had expected after the
horrors at Gallipoli, the 5th Wiltshires instead were transported straight through
Egypt to participate in the ultimately successful Mesopotamian campaign, playing their part in the captures of Al Kut and Baghdad, and then surging northwest
for five hundred miles—once again en route to their old objective, Constantinople, in a major outflanking campaign, but this time from a different direction.
MARITIME MANEUVER IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD
Britain’s grueling experience on the western front reinforced a preference for a
smarter, less attritional way of war, and found obvious expression in the writings
of Basil Liddell Hart and his conception in 1932 of a “British way in warfare” and
the notion of “limited liability,” and later of the “indirect approach.”55 But this
did not result in a high priority being attached to preparations for the conduct of
amphibious operations. Instead, in straitened postwar years, Britain’s focus was
on the battle to retain command of the sea, partly through habit and sentiment,
and partly from the entirely logical position that if this battle were lost then
amphibious operations and other such forms of sea-based maneuver would be
impossible anyway.
Until the mid-1930s, the campaign to maintain the deterrent effect of naval
dominance (another form of maneuver, if a bloodless one) was fought in the
conference chamber, where diplomacy—to upend Clausewitz—became the continuation of war by other means; in conditions of a peace of a sort, diplomacy
naturally moved to the fore in Britain’s campaign. The result was a series of essays
in naval arms control that broadly suited Britain’s strategic aims. The British also
were generally successful in consolidating legal limits on cruiser warfare while
preserving belligerent rights and their options to blockade.56 This same proclivity for seeking to secure valuable strategic objectives by methods other than the
overt use of military force continued into the Second World War, most notably
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through Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill’s assiduous courtship of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the military-industrial might of the United States.57
Since this would dramatically shift the correlation of forces between Britain and
its enemies, for Churchill nothing was more important.
THE NORMANDY INVASION
Inevitably, once the war started, this continuing diplomatic campaign was accompanied by considerable debate about the form that British military action
should take, with Churchill once again demonstrating his preference for what
some have called the indirect and “peripheral” approach.58 Somewhat skeptical
about the efficacy of blockade even before Germany insulated itself against some
of its worst effects by taking over the resources of much of mainland Europe,
Churchill’s personal search for maneuver led him to a number of options. These
included such schemes as Operation CATHERINE in the Baltic, possibly in conjunction with an attack on the Scandinavian sources of much of Germany’s iron
ore, until he allowed himself to be dissuaded from it by his military advisers.59
He also encouraged insurgencies across occupied Europe and the launching of
amphibious raids on its coastline. More ambitiously still, fighting campaigns (or
looking to start them) in North and East Africa, the Balkans, the Aegean, and
the eastern Mediterranean—far away from the main center of German military
strength—illustrated the same impulse. Nowhere was this more evident than in
the contentions over the timing and nature of the amphibious landings in Normandy in 1944.
Normandy: The Strategic-Level Debate
British “peripheralism” increasingly was resisted by President Roosevelt and
the bulk of the U.S. political and military staffs, although it never was simply a
question of the British versus the Americans; some of Churchill’s own military
advisers concluded that the strategic benefit of such “eccentric” campaigns was
outweighed by the risks and the costs, while some of Roosevelt’s thought they
were not. For example, William C. Bullitt, a former U.S. ambassador to Russia
and a confidant of the president, was strongly in favor of opening a Balkan campaign, while Field Marshal Alanbrooke, British army, frequently dissented from
Churchill’s approach, as is immediately obvious from reading his unexpurgated
diaries.60
Neither was it a question of “doing” Normandy or not doing it, as some observers have gotten close to saying.61 In fact, Churchill was clear that sooner or
later the invasion would need to be done. He appointed Louis Mountbatten to
reinvigorate Combined Operations Headquarters in late 1941, telling him that his
command should move on from minor raids and that his “main object must be
the reinvasion of France. You must create the machine which will make it possible
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for us to beat Hitler on land. You must devise the appurtenances and appliances
which will make the invasion possible.”62 Indeed, initially Churchill himself supported the idea of invading France in 1943, but was dissuaded by Alanbrooke and
the other British service chiefs.63
Later, the real issue was the appropriate circumstances and timing for launching the operation. Churchill did all he could to resist the American view that “a
straight line is the shortest distance between two points,” if that meant either
attempting the invasion before sufficient operational experience and battlehardened forces had been accumulated, or completely missing the opportunity to
exploit additional strategic possibilities should they arise. Preparations needed to
be made and options needed
It was one of the supreme ironies of the [1944] to be maintained.64
In either case, Churchill
Normandy campaign that the maneuverist
counseled, there was much
British ended up fighting an attritionalist
to be said for delay and keepwar there, while the apparently attritionaling all options open. For the
ist Americans were able to fight a sometimes
Americans, though, there
heavy but faster-moving war to the south.
was much to be said for closing them down and getting on with it. In the First World War, they had insisted
that their only contribution would be to the conduct of war on the western front
against the main enemy, Germany. That also was their preference in the Second
World War in Europe, reinforced in this case by a dislike of getting involved in
anything that smacked of reconstituting the British Empire. More particularly, the
demands of the Pacific War were urgent and powerfully underlined by the likes of
General Douglas MacArthur, USA, and Admiral Ernest J. King, USN. The Americans’ growing strength in both manpower and matériel made them increasingly
confident of ultimate victory even in a frontal assault, and, of course, also better
able to prevail in contentious Allied councils with the “slippery” British.65
The broad result of all this is well known, even if some of the detail is being
fought over still. Most historians concede that Churchill and the British chiefs
were right to resist the hankering of Roosevelt and many U.S. senior military
leaders for a direct assault on France in 1942 or 1943.66 Churchill and his service
chiefs were able to get their way on this because at that time the bulk of the invasion forces were likely to be British. In the event, Roosevelt too was easily persuaded that delay was the wisest course of action, especially when the difficulties
of a frontal amphibious assault were made savagely clear at Dieppe in 1942 and
the deficiencies of inexperienced U.S. forces were underlined in the 1943 battle
of Kasserine Pass.67 Neither meant that Normandy should not be done, but both
suggested it should not be done before the circumstances were right and the necessary forces, equipment, and skills had been accumulated.
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But this was the crux of the issue. On the one hand, both sides agreed that
Operation OVERLORD, as a frontal assault on Germany at one of its strongest positions, would be extremely demanding operationally, and so required careful and
extensive preparation. This meant that the invasion should not be launched until
the early part of 1944. Both sides agreed, also, that in the meantime some of those
forces would be available for, and should professionally profit from, other operations. Hopefully those interim operations would take some strategic pressure off
the Russians on the eastern front, thereby solidifying the alliance. This argument
also could help keep Admiral King and the U.S. Pacific-first school at bay.
On this basis, Churchill was able to persuade his colleagues to focus on the
Mediterranean, first for the Operation TORCH landings, next for the seizure of
Sicily, and then for an invasion of peninsular Italy.68 Alanbrooke justified this as
a distracting, diversionary prerequisite for a successful landing and campaign in
France, not a substitute for it.69 Up Churchill’s sleeve, and to some extent Alanbrooke’s as well, were plans for operations in the Aegean, especially against Rhodes,
all with the aim of bringing Turkey into the war and opening up a new Balkan
front.70 To its skeptics, this scheme seemed to be fighting the Gallipoli campaign all
over again. Operation JUPITER, the concept for a major campaign against Norway,
was seen as yet another of Churchill’s “reckless and impracticable schemes.”71
It was at this point that Churchill’s peripheralist propensities ran into the sand.
The date for Operation OVERLORD had been agreed at the Quebec conference in
August 1943; it was to be 1 May 1944. At the later Cairo (SEXTANT) and Tehran
conferences of 1943, however, Churchill encountered decisive resistance to his
proposals for further indirect attempts to weaken the German position in the
strategic center by multiple threats from its edges. He and Alanbrooke did, however, win a month’s delay, pushing the invasion back to 1 June 1944.72 The battle at
Kasserine and other problems in the North African campaign, the later stages of
the Sicily operation, the extreme dangers faced in the Salerno landings, the slow
progress of the march on Rome, and the disastrous British campaign against the
Dodecanese islands all showed that Churchill and Britain’s preferred indirect approach commonly required more and stronger forces than were readily available
without a yet-longer delay to the launch of Operation OVERLORD. And against
that, Roosevelt and the American chiefs were adamant.
Churchill’s last victory in the Italian campaign was the agreement to invest
in the Anzio landing as a means of hastening the seizure of Rome. But this too
proved less effective than hoped. As Churchill confided to his doctor, “Anzio was
my worst moment in the war. I had most to do with it. I didn’t want two Suvla
Bays in one lifetime.”73 What he meant by this was that, once again, the promise
of rapid maneuver after a successful landing had been thrown away. It seemed
that the operational indecision of its commander, Major General John P. Lucas,
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USA, produced delays that allowed the enemy to concentrate forces against the
beachhead.74 Thereafter the ground favored the defense and progress was slow;
later still, the political prize of taking Rome outweighed, at least in the eyes of
Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, USA, the possibility instead of cutting off and
destroying Field Marshal Albert Kesselring’s main forces in Italy as they retreated
north. This would have forced the Germans either to abandon the country or to
reinforce it with yet more troops that otherwise would have been able to go to
France or the eastern front.
Thereafter, Roosevelt, his military men, and Stalin were adamant; the strategic
effect of such eccentric operations, even if successful, did not warrant the enormous risks that would follow delaying OVERLORD further, especially if this pushed
it back into 1945 or later. For the same reason, and even though it was launched
weeks after OVERLORD, they insisted on using the landing craft released from that
operation on a supplementary supporting invasion of southern France rather than
a further attempt at outflanking the German defenses by an amphibious assault
north of Rome. The strategic weight of the Russians and the Americans, with
their hundreds of divisions, eclipsed the British effort, and Churchill found that
imagination and eloquence made little headway against such military realities.75
Nor was Churchill alone in his disappointment. Like most of his colleagues,
Alanbrooke, who unlike Churchill was focused chiefly on the distracting effect of the Italian campaign rather than treating northern Italy as a launchpad
for offensives somewhere else, lamented the loss of a strategic opportunity that
he thought the U.S. fixation on a specific and artificial date for OVERLORD had
caused. “I despair,” he said, “of ever getting our American friends to have any sort
of strategic vision.”76 This—doubtless written in the heat of the moment—was
unfair; it was just that the Americans had a different kind of strategic vision,
one framed by the confidence that derived from large numbers, huge industrial
power, and the urgent strategic and political demands of the Pacific theater. Lacking much of this, the British hoped to gain their objectives by what they thought
more subtle means.
Normandy: The Operational Level
Unlike Gallipoli, the Normandy campaign was from the outset conceived of as
a joint exercise in maneuver, with naval forces taking a particularly crucial role
at the beginning. Indeed, without their winning sufficient sea control to ensure
the transport of troops and military and economic supplies across the Atlantic
to the United Kingdom, and then to deliver the invading forces across the Channel safely, the operation would not have been possible at all. Given the German
army’s recognized fighting proficiency, it was especially important that the Allies win the race to build up logistic support in theater, and this was thought to
require the transport of the two Mulberry harbors across to Normandy.77 This
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extraordinary feat demanded near-total command of the sea and perfectly illustrates the enabling function of sea power in a campaign of maritime maneuver.
The whole campaign in fact does much to justify the Royal Navy’s policy preoccupation throughout the interwar period on the requirements of the campaign
to win and retain sea control.
It was certainly true that both Churchill and Alanbrooke were concerned
that, even so, OVERLORD could go horribly wrong.78 The risks made them both
anxious. A catastrophic failure certainly would have lengthened the war and
even might have imperiled ultimate victory. On the day of the landings, and
subsequently, naval forces delivered the invading troops to the beaches, sought
to suppress the defenders’ powers of resistance, stood by to reembark troops if
required, and kept the necessary supplies coming. Inevitably, as the campaign
progressed, its naval element became less prominent as the baton passed instead
to the land and air forces.
However, after the initial success of the British and Canadian landings, it
rapidly became clear that once again the fates had conspired against any British attempt at operational-level maneuver in the land campaign. The British
and Canadians were allocated the eastern landing beaches, JUNE, SWORD, and
GOLD—for almost accidental reasons. Because they were slated to be later arrivals at Normandy, they largely staged from the west of England. It only made sense
logistically for the Americans to be allocated the western beaches; this would
provide the easiest access for shipping coming across the Atlantic and would
avoid crossing the British and Canadian supply lines from central and eastern
England.79
The result was that the British and Canadian forces were squeezed into the
comparatively narrow area between the potentially flooded area south of Dives to
the north and the American force to the south. They were landed directly before
the city of Caen, which initially was seen as a high priority because it seemed the
natural site from which to launch the rapid advance on Paris that General Bernard L. Montgomery, British army, in his more intemperate moments, had promised. Their totally unsurprising failure to take the city on the first day doomed
them to a slow and grinding battle of attrition, partly because of the topography
but mainly because it was the obvious place for German reinforcements to gather,
as it was nearest to their forces guarding the Calais area.80
Criticized for the slowness of the British Commonwealth advance by
Marshal Aleksandr Vassilievsky, who was visiting from the Soviet army, one
British officer explained the basic problem. While in his six-hundred-mile sector of the eastern front Vassilievsky had faced nine German divisions, the British on a front just sixty-two miles wide before Caen were fighting significant
elements of ten German divisions, six of which were panzer formations; and
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if anything, this was an underestimation of their opposition’s strength. In the
EPSOM operation, 26 June–1 July, the British faced elements of eight panzer divisions, five of which were of the Waffen-SS. In such circumstances, action hardly
could be anything but attritional and grindingly slow.81
Both at the time and since, Montgomery’s reputation has suffered also from
ambiguities about what he conceived his operational mission to be. On occasions,
the impression he gave was of an intention to take Caen rapidly, then strike out on
a dazzling march on Paris. On
other occasions he purported
British experience is worth remembering in
to be “fixing” the bulk of Gertoday’s ferment of ideas about how a new
man defenders on the Caen
campaign in the Pacific might be conducted.
front, holding them down so
That experience seems to underline the point
that Allied forces to the south
that even in the most maneuverist of campaigns there will be attritionalist moments in could loop around, smash
through thinner defenses, and
which mass still matters.
head toward Germany. If maneuver by movement against German forces at Caen proved impossible, it would
need to be replaced by controlled attrition; the hope was that fixing these German units at Caen would increase the prospects for maneuver by movement in
the American sector to the south.82 This version of Montgomery’s argument was
exactly the same as Churchill’s for extra investment in the failing Norwegian campaign of 1940 and in Italy in 1944. In both cases, critics of this approach argued
that the tactical realities on the ground and the actual correlation of forces in the
theater raised doubts about the approach’s ability to create an effective diversion.
Accordingly, the question of who would be tying down whom was moot.83
As a result of all this, it paradoxically was the Americans who, once they had
conquered the problem of the bocage, were able eventually to engage in a much
faster campaign of movement and maneuver, eventually swinging around to head
for Paris from the southwest, as arguably had been planned from the start.84 It
was one of the supreme ironies of the Normandy campaign that the maneuverist
British ended up fighting an attritionalist war there, while the apparently attritionalist Americans were able to fight a sometimes heavy but faster-moving war
to the south.
Admittedly, at various stages in subsequent campaigns in western Europe,
both were required to revert to what was supposed to be their respective “form”
of campaigning. The September 1944 assault on Arnhem in the Netherlands
indeed represented a “bridge too far” in British leaders’ attempt to restore their
concept of movement; afterward, on the northern flank of the Allied campaign,
Montgomery’s forces were more successful, if slower than anticipated. As for the
Americans, compared with the rapid advance that had preceded it, nothing could
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have been more attritionalist than the December 1944–January 1945 Battle of the
Bulge in the Ardennes region. The experiences of these partners confirm that the
relationship between the two apparent styles of war is complementary rather than
one of polarized opposites.
With the Allies having consolidated their position in France, the last flicker
of the dynamic between maneuver and attrition may be seen in the debate about
the conduct of the final phase in the war, specifically about whether they should
advance on Germany across a broad front, as General Dwight D. Eisenhower,
USA, advocated, or with a narrower, more concentrated thrust in the north, led,
inevitably, by Montgomery. This resulted in vituperative exchanges between British and American leaders, particularly during and after the conduct of the Battle
of the Bulge. As General Omar N. Bradley, USA, put it, “[T]he British came at
us like sharks at a shipwreck,” with Montgomery being the “most vicious and
ravenous” leader of the pack. It is hard not to conclude that mixed in with this
apparent debate about the best way to seek operational maneuver was more than
a dash of competing national interests, different interpretations about the likely
future of a liberated Europe, sensitivity to press impressions, and the vanities
and professional jealousies of senior military men who by this time were getting
very tired. Both Bradley and Lieutenant General George S. Patton Jr., USA, also
urged, and then conducted, narrow and concentrated thrusts in which the Allies
were competing with each other (in a nonlethal manner) almost as much as they
were with the Germans. By this stage of the war, in fact, the state of the German
defenses made maneuver much easier for everyone, even if in American eyes the
British were overly cautious in taking advantage of it.85
Normandy: The Tactical Level
The British were acutely aware of the scale of risk the Normandy landings
posed at the tactical level. Experience had demonstrated that amphibious operations were uniquely complex and demanding, and their German adversaries
time and again had shown themselves to be formidable, even with the odds
stacked against them. Tactical maneuver in the landing phase was designed to
reduce the level of risk as much as possible, and was to be supplied partly by the
imaginative use of airborne forces to divert and mystify the German defenders,
and partly through mechanical means such as “Hobart’s funnies,” which were
to help the invaders get ashore and consolidate with a minimum expenditure
of life.86 Both were successful, at least in the early stages; later, things did not
go as planned.
This was in part a tribute to the tactical performance of the German defenders. Such was the resisting power of the German army—particularly its impressive capacity for effective counterattack at every level of war—that the resulting
campaign was mainly attritional for all concerned, and so yielded much the same
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casualty figures, as a proportion of those engaged, as was suffered on the western
front in the First World War.87 The battle for France resulted in roughly seven
thousand killed or wounded Allied and German soldiers every week—much the
same figure as from the Somme, Passchendaele, and Verdun.88 The combination
of determined and skilled soldiery, modern weaponry, and physical obstacles
(hedges, hills, woods, and rivers and defended farmsteads, villages, and towns)
made battle seem distinctly attritional to everyone engaged in it.
In practical terms, just as in the Gallipoli campaign, however hard they tried
in their search for maneuver, the British still seemed often to end up in attritional
conflict—certainly at the tactical level.
And after Normandy?
Probably the last flicker of strategic peripheralism was the notion put forward by
Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, British army, and Churchill for an advance from northern Italy through the so-called Ljubljana Gap and on to Vienna, a
project shaped more by the political attractions of getting there before Stalin than any
deep appreciation of such a campaign’s military feasibility.89 Against their collective
opposition, however, Operation ANVIL, a landing in southern France—portrayed as
much more directly supportive of the Normandy campaign—went ahead anyway.90
Further afield, Churchill’s peripheralist proclivities again were on display in
Southeast Asia and the Far East, where initially the prime minister was reluctant
to sanction major operations against Rangoon and Singapore, or even smallerscale and more-dubious operations such as the reconquest of the Andaman
Islands. He was long averse to the “laborious reconquest of Burma, swamp by
swamp.”91 Instead he sought Operation CULVERIN, the seizure of the western
tip of Sumatra as a base from which to prosecute the war against the Japanese,
perhaps from the soft underbelly of Southeast Asia, and as a possible means of
strategically linking up with Australia and General MacArthur’s campaign along
the Dutch East Indies to the Philippines.
Initially, the British and American service chiefs were able quickly to show that
the means for such a bold and demanding operation simply were not available. In
the longer term, Alanbrooke and his colleagues pressed for a policy focused on
directly joining the Americans in the final assault on Japan in the Pacific, rather
than on the eventual reconquest of British and Dutch possessions in Southeast
Asia, which remained Churchill’s preference (more in service to imperial interests than in the cause of strategic maneuver).92 For all Churchill’s enthusiasm for
the imaginative style of war practiced by Major General Orde Wingate, British
army, and the Chindits, the dominating feature of the final, successful imperial
Burma campaign, the spring 1944 battle of Kohima-Imphal, and arguably the
biggest defeat of the Japanese army in the whole war, hardly could have been
more attritional.93 However, the final, rushed campaign (Operation EXTENDED
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CAPITAL, from December 1944 to February 1945) of Lieutenant General William J. Slim, British army, to cross the Irrawaddy River, outflank Mandalay, seize
Meiktila and Maymyo, and open the way to Rangoon and the final destruction of
the Japanese army in Burma, all before the monsoon broke, was one of the most
successful maneuverist operations of the war. It provided a land-based example
of the British aspiration for maneuver, ultimately deriving success from the seabased capacity to move into and accumulate in theater the necessary forces and
sustain them until the conditions for victory were achieved.94
SO WHY THE BRITISH SEARCH FOR MANEUVER?
Obviously, all military forces will prefer to “fight smart” and to avoid the common costs of frontal assaults if they can, but British strategic culture does seem to
be particularly inclined that way. The following possible reasons for this are tentative and conjectural in the extreme, but may help to explain the phenomenon.
In the first place, British manpower (as opposed to voluntary Empire and
Commonwealth manpower) was limited in comparison with that of Britain’s
adversaries. From the time of the first Queen Elizabeth, the country’s population size relative to that of its major adversaries had to be a major consideration.
At the end of the seventeenth century, the population of France was more than
twice England’s. In the Second World War, Britain could not field anything like
the number of divisions in the European theater that Germany, Russia, or the
United States could. At its peak, the British army in the First World War had
mustered seventy-three divisions, but the British had no chance of reaching that
total in the second war because of the personnel demands from a huge air force
and a navy twice as big as it had been in the first war. The demands of a greatly
expanded war industry were severe too.95 In the summer of 1941, the British army
comprised just thirty-seven divisions, dubiously trained and equipped, while
Hitler controlled 250. It pained Churchill that the U.S. Army so greatly outnumbered that of Britain, but he accepted it as a consequence of the simple fact that
the U.S. population was three times larger than Britain’s.96 Nevertheless, one of
Alanbrooke’s special problems was to persuade Churchill that army manpower
had to be reduced significantly rather than increased, well before the end of the
war, if there was to be any hope of economic recovery afterward. Hence there was
an inbuilt military and economic need to husband human resources rather than
fritter them away in costly direct attacks on strongly held positions.
Allied to this, arguably, was the standard refrain, echoed by Correlli Barnett
and countless others, that Britain had mixed feelings about the maintenance
of large standing armies anyway.97 In part this is said to be attributable to the
threat that Cromwell’s army had posed to civil liberties in the seventeenth century and to the costs of keeping such an army, which could be met only by the
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trading classes, whose interests apparently were served much better by naval
investments.
This all tracked well with a Corbettian sense that sea power was the central
component that enabled strategies of maritime maneuver that intrinsically were
more cost-effective than the more land-centric and potentially attritionalist
alternatives. In comparison with battles on land, the “butcher’s bill” at sea generally was lower. Sea power, Mackinder claimed, “expended men with . . . singular
economy.”98 Moreover, by making use of the sea as the world’s greatest maneuver
space (until the advent of today’s space and cyber domains, that is), mastery of the
sea provided many more opportunities for the indirect attack of a land-bound adversary, and for the British to shape the future of the world in the way they wanted.
In consequence of all this, as Duff Cooper famously proclaimed before an
American audience, the British and their allies thought they had “found a new
way to make war—without sacrificing human lives.”99 The tragedy was that, in all
too many circumstances, they had not.
British experience is worth remembering in today’s ferment of ideas about
how a new campaign in the Pacific might be conducted. That experience seems
to underline the point that even in the most maneuverist of campaigns there will
be attritionalist moments in which mass still matters. Declines in population size
and industrial might relative to adversaries (and allies) made it increasingly difficult for Britain to accumulate the military mass necessary for decisive diplomatic
effect. Success, when it came, depended on the targeted use of transformational
technology, superior training, and seamless cooperation among the military
services, each of which needed to succeed in their supporting aims at all levels of
war. Clarity about both aim and method was essential. Success required an absolute nurturing of, and reliance on, supportive allies. Above all, “naval action,” said
Corbett, had to “be nicely coordinated with military and diplomatic pressure.”100
In today’s terminology, it needs to be part of a well-integrated, whole-ofgovernment approach. Whatever their strategic attractions, campaigns of maritime maneuver, in short, are inherently demanding—especially when up against
serious opposition—and cannot be improvised or economized safely.
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